Temperance, Tyranny, and the Metaphysical Constitution of the Soul: Plato’s Charmides and the Esoteric Teachings of Reale and Strauss

Among Plato’s so-called “early” dialogues, Charmides stands out as a work of great subtlety and metaphysical depth. On its surface, the dialogue is a simple Socratic exercise in defining the virtue of sophrosyne, commonly rendered as “temperance” or “moderation.” It ends, like many other early dialogues, in aporia: Socrates and his interlocutors fail to establish a definitive account of the virtue, and we are left with uncertainty.

But as Giovanni Reale and Leo Strauss each show in their own way, this surface perplexity conceals a deeper pedagogical structure. The dialogue is not a failure, but a carefully crafted ascent—one that gestures toward the true nature of temperance, virtue, and ultimately, the just soul and the lawful polis. To the attentive reader, Charmides offers a blueprint for understanding the foundations of law, virtue, and rational governance. It is a dialogue not about failure, but about the soul’s awakening to its need for metaphysical order.

The Drama of Charmides: Beauty, Power, and Wisdom

The setting is charged with political and erotic tension. Socrates returns from war and encounters the stunningly beautiful Charmides in the gymnasium. His beauty draws the attention not just of Socrates, but of the whole crowd, his appearance is likened to that of a god. But the question arises: does outward beauty reflect inward order? Does he possess sôphrosynê?

This leads to a series of proposed definitions: temperance is quietness, doing one's own business, self-knowledge, or the knowledge of knowledge. Each is tested and found wanting. Socrates eventually leads his interlocutor—Charmides, but increasingly Critias—into deeper and more abstract waters. The turning point arrives when temperance is equated with knowledge of what one knows and does not know. But this raises troubling questions: Can such a reflexive science be practically useful? Can it produce the Good? Can it bring about happiness?

By the dialogue’s end, all definitions have failed. Yet Socrates closes with a note of moral seriousness: if it turns out that temperance is truly present in Charmides’ soul, he must pursue it with all his might. The virtue remains real, even if our rational grasp of it falters.

Reale’s Reading: From Forms to Principles

Giovanni Reale, the great Italian interpreter of Plato, would likely view Charmides not as a dead-end but as a pointer to Plato’s unwritten doctrines. According to Reale, dialogues that end in aporia  reveal their true teaching only when read in light of Plato’s later metaphysical framework, especially the doctrine of first principles (archai) that undergird the Forms. These principles, most fundamentally, the One and the Indefinite Dyad, constitute the pre-formal ground of intelligibility and being.

Reale argues that the failure to define sôphrosynê dialectically is not a failure at all. Rather, it is a deliberate moment of pedagogical purification, preparing the reader for the metaphysical insight that true virtue cannot be captured by mere logos. Temperance, for Reale, must be viewed as the soul’s harmonious participation in the rational order of Being. To “know oneself” is not psychological introspection but metaphysical self-location: to recognize one’s place in the cosmic hierarchy, ordered toward the Good.  This is a common theme in Reale’s interpretive approach.  One which I share. 

In this light, the aporia of Charmides is not an ending but a threshold. The soul is led, through failed definition, to an experience of its own incompleteness. This prepares it to ascend, not analytically, but noetically, toward the reality of virtue as participation in divine reason.

Strauss’ Reading: Philosophy, Moderation, and Political Danger

Though Leo Strauss never specifically commented on the Charmides, we can apply a reasonable approximation of his approach.  Strauss approaches the dialogue from another angle than Reale.   Strauss, of course, is equally esoteric but more attuned to the political problem. For Strauss, Charmides might be a study in the relationship between philosophy, virtue, and the city. Socrates stands between two dangerous forces: the charismatic, beautiful youth (Charmides), and the powerful, ruthless intellect (Critias), who would later become one of the Thirty Tyrants.

Strauss is always alert to the way Socrates speaks, not just what he says, but how and to whom. Socrates educates not by proclaiming truths, but by leading his interlocutors into productive confusion. His irony protects philosophy from the hostility of the city. In Charmides, Socrates uses temperance as a test: Can Charmides be brought to care more about his soul than his appearance? Can Critias, full of ambition and cleverness, be made to see the limits of mere intellect?

What emerges is a vision of temperance not as an abstract definition, but as a condition for the emergence of philosophy itself. Only the moderate soul is open to the whole. Only the temperate man can govern himself and others justly. Socrates, by refusing to finalize the definition of sôphrosynê, teaches by example, through restraint, a model of lawful self-rule. In this, Strauss sees not failure, but a hidden victory: the philosophical life preserves itself through moderation, irony, and the refusal to force conclusions.

Toward a Metaphysical Jurisprudence

Reale and Strauss, though they might differ in emphasis, converge on a profound insight: Charmides is a dialogue about the soul’s constitution. Temperance is not just a virtue among others, it is the condition for justice, the ground of reason, and the inner form of lawful order.

For my own project in Metaphysical Jurisprudence, Charmides offers a foundational lesson. The law must be more than rules; it must reflect the rational order of the soul. Juridical legitimacy depends not on procedural correctness alone, but on the presence of sôphrosynê—the self-rule of reason in the individual and in the polity. This is not a utopian ideal, but a metaphysical necessity. Where temperance fails, tyranny follows—whether in the soul (as appetite usurps reason) or in the state (as power severs itself from wisdom).

Plato, through Socrates, leads us to this truth not by telling us, but by showing us: in the failure to define temperance, he awakens the soul to its need for the Good. Reale sees this as the soul’s upward ascent toward metaphysical participation. Strauss sees it as the political philosopher’s art of survival and teaching under pressure. Both are right. And both speak to us still, who seek to ground law not in will or power, but in the permanent things.