Title: Neo-Aristotelian Psychology and the
Foundations of Legal Personhood: A Revival for Metaphysical Jurisprudence
Abstract: This article outline argues that a revival
of Neo-Aristotelian psychology is essential to the restoration of a coherent
legal philosophy rooted in metaphysical realism. Drawing on Aristotelian and
Thomistic insights, as well as contemporary developments in analytic philosophy,
it challenges the dominant mechanistic models of mind and agency in both
academic psychology and law. The article defends the unity of personhood, the
teleological structure of action, and the irreducibility of intent—all of which
are foundational to legal responsibility and constitutional interpretation. It
concludes by situating Neo-Aristotelian psychology as a core pillar in a
broader project of metaphysical jurisprudence.
I. Introduction In recent decades, the foundations of
legal responsibility have come under increasing strain from developments in
cognitive science, neuroscience, and behaviorist psychology. These fields,
often committed to reductive models of mind, propose a vision of human action
and thought that threatens the metaphysical underpinnings of culpability,
consent, and rational agency. Against this background, Neo-Aristotelian
psychology offers a compelling alternative. This framework revives Aristotle’s
conception of the soul as the form of a living body, capable of rational
thought and purposive action. In doing so, it restores a metaphysical
vocabulary capable of grounding the legal and moral predicates central to
jurisprudence.
II. The Ontological Status of the Person Aristotle’s
conception of the human being as a rational animal—a composite of form and
matter—stands in stark contrast to the mechanistic and dualist paradigms that
dominate modern psychology. On the Neo-Aristotelian view, mind is not a thing
or a machine, nor merely brain activity; it is the unified, embodied activity
of a living being pursuing intelligible ends. As such, personhood is
irreducibly normative. Concepts such as intent, belief, desire, and
responsibility do not describe neural events but acts of the whole person.
Peter Hacker and Daniel Robinson have powerfully argued that the very grammar
of psychological terms presupposes person-level agency, not sub-personal
causation.
III. Psychology, Law, and Normativity Modern legal
systems are structured around concepts that assume the intelligibility of
volition, choice, and responsibility. The law punishes those who intend
harm, distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary acts, and grounds
contract in consent. Yet these core legal ideas lose coherence if mental life
is reduced to neural activity or environmental conditioning. Neo-Aristotelian
psychology defends a teleological framework in which human action is always
already oriented toward ends. In this view, to act is to act for a reason. Such
a view restores the conceptual foundations for legal categories such as mens
rea, negligence, and the reasonable person standard.
IV. Virtue, Emotion, and Responsibility Where
mechanistic models view emotion as a biochemical reflex, Neo-Aristotelianism
understands emotion as an evaluative response shaped by reason and character.
On this model, a person’s anger or fear is not merely a physiological
disturbance but a rational (or irrational) judgment about the world. This
conception reestablishes the intelligibility of moral culpability and the
educability of the emotions. It also reinforces the classical idea, central to
common law and natural law traditions, that justice is not merely procedural
but rooted in virtue. Character, not just act, matters—a premise found
throughout Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and echoed in the development
of the English common law.
V. Contemporary Revival and Juridical Application
Recent decades have witnessed a renaissance of Aristotelian thought in analytic
philosophy. Thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot, John McDowell,
and Jennifer Frey have defended forms of ethical naturalism rooted in virtue
and practical reason. In philosophy of mind, Peter Hacker and Matthew Boyle are
challenging the neuroscientific reduction of psychological predicates. This
revival has begun to influence legal theory, particularly among scholars
sympathetic to natural law and virtue jurisprudence. The integration of
Neo-Aristotelian psychology with legal theory promises a metaphysical
jurisprudence that honors the unity of the human person and the moral
intelligibility of action.
VI. Conclusion: A Pillar of Metaphysical Jurisprudence
Neo-Aristotelian psychology does not merely offer an alternative to the
prevailing scientific paradigms; it restores the possibility of a legal
philosophy grounded in the real nature of human beings. By affirming the unity
of body and soul, the teleology of action, and the educability of emotion and
character, it supplies the metaphysical scaffolding for moral and legal
responsibility. In so doing, it becomes an indispensable foundation for a
renewed metaphysical jurisprudence—one capable of resisting the disintegration
of personhood and preserving the moral structure of law.
